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Improving Cross-Border Investment Regulation:
A Case Study of China’s Largest and Least Known
Sovereign Wealth Fund
Margalit Faden*
This paper highlights current problems in the international regulatory
regime governing sovereign wealth funds by examining Chinese-funded
Safe Investment Company’s equity investments into three Australian banks.
It proceeds by analyzing how the operative laws and international
agreements governing those investments--Hong Kong law, Australian law,
the New York Convention, and customary international law—fail in part to
adequately regulate the cross-border investments of one of the largest and
most opaque sovereign wealth funds in the world. Assessment of existing
legal oversight and Hong Kong’s strict absolute sovereign immunity stance
leads to the conclusion that the Safe Investment Company’s investments
must be closely regulated. As sovereign wealth increasingly makes its way
across borders, domestic or regional legislation accounting for the unique
considerations attached to sovereign wealth investments must be carefully
crafted by both developing and developed countries.
As such,
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communication channels between “like economies” need to be established
to consider how best to regulate such investments.
Additionally,
discussions must be held between those countries that have already
developed foreign investment policies sensitive to opaque investment of
sovereign wealth and those that have not.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since they stepped onto the financial scene, sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) have caused a stir. Their distinctive stature as funds originating from
sovereign power involves consideration of additional issues not usually linked to
conventional institutional investors. This article explores the mechanisms by
which an SWF’s actions are regulated by examining a case study in Section II of a
typical portfolio investment by an opaque SWF, Safe Investment Company Ltd.,
into three Australian banks. Section III analyzes why and how such mechanisms
can be improved to facilitate better oversight of SWFs like Safe Investment
Company. Section IV concludes that adequate regulatory oversight of Safe
Investment Company can be provided by relying upon international investment
treaties and host countries’ foreign investment policies. The unique considerations
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raised by investments of an entity like Safe Investment Company, however, must
be specifically and thoughtfully addressed in order to enable both developed and
developing countries to better prepare for sovereign wealth investments.

II. CASE STUDY
A. Description of Safe Investment Company
1. Origin and Structure
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) was established in
1978. SAFE is primarily charged with managing the People’s Bank of China’s
(PBoC) foreign exchange activities and overseeing foreign exchange market
activities.1 SAFE is led by four deputy administrators and one administrator. Ties
with other government entities exist. SAFE’s administrator acts as the Deputy
Governor of the People’s Bank of China2 and sits, along with one SAFE deputy
administrator, on the board of the China Investment Corporation as a nonexecutive director.3 This overlap between the two entities may prevent them from
stepping on each other’s toes when assessing investments but additionally opens
up the possibility of information sharing that could potentially affect markets.
The Safe Investment Company Ltd. (SIC) was registered in Hong Kong
on June 2, 1997.4 It is one of four overseas SAFE subsidiaries. The other three
are in Singapore, London, and New York.5 SIC is constituted of 300 million
ordinary shares, each with a nominal value of HKD 1. Both its authorized and
issued share capital is HKD 300 million (about 38.56 million USD).6 All shares
*LL.M., Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore; J.D., Boston University
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1
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, GOV.CN (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/09/content_75318.htm.
2
About SAFE, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, http://www.safe.gov.cn/
(click “English” hyperlink; then select “About Safe” tab).
3
Board of Directors, CHINA INVESTMENT CORPORATION, http://www.chinainv.cn/cicen/governance/governing_bod.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
4
Company Name Search: SAFE Investment Company, Ltd., CYBER SEARCH CENTRE OF
THE INTEGRATED COMPANIES REGISTRY INFORMATION SYSTEM,
http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do (type SAFE Investment Company, Ltd.
in search box to get date of registration).
5
Yu Ning, Foreign Reserves Seek Higher Investments, CAIJING.COM.CN, Feb. 28, 2008,
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-04-28/100058739.html.
6
Notification of Increase in Nominal Share Capital, CYBER SEARCH CENTRE OF THE
INTEGRATED COMPANIES REGISTRY INFORMATION SYSTEM, Oct. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do for a nominal fee. This number was
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are owned by SAFE.7 Additionally, SIC’s 2011 annual return lists three directors
and one secretary. The secretary resides in Hong Kong and is responsible for
ensuring compliance with Hong Kong law and for maintaining the company’s
records and books. One director is listed as residing in Hong Kong, and two are
listed as residing in the PRC.8 One PRC director, Yin Yong, is also the Director
General of SAFE, which is the highest executive office in the organization.9
2. Sources of Funding
Although no information is publicly available concerning funding sources,
it appears that SIC’s funding comes primarily from SAFE’s earnings on foreign
exchange transactions. SAFE has released data stating that its investments abroad,
both portfolio and direct, currently total about 589.5 billion USD. 10 The
percentage of those investments that SIC handles, however, is unclear.
Furthermore, SIC’s Memorandum of Association states that one of its objects is
“to undertake the management of state foreign exchange reserves or other business
authorised by central banks.” 11 It states that another purpose underlying its
creation is “to undertake the management of investment funds of all types on a
worldwide basis.”12

increased from 100 million ordinary shares at par value HK 1 (about 12.87 million USD)
on 17 October 2011. 2011 Filed SAFE Investment Company Ltd. Annual Return, CYBER
SEARCH CENTRE OF THE INTEGRATED COMPANIES REGISTRY INFORMATION SYSTEM, June
2, 2011, available at http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do for a nominal fee.
http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do for a nominal fee.
7
2011 Filed SAFE Investment Company Ltd. Annual Return, supra note 6, at 3.
8
2011 Filed SAFE Investment Company Ltd. Annual Return, supra note 6, at 4-10.
9
Baobab2050, WikiLeaks: (Chinese) Money Talks, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://baobab2050.org/2011/01/01/wikileaks-chinese-money-talks/.
10
China’s International Investment Position (2011 Q2), STATE ADMINISTRATION OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE, December 28, 2012,
http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/Data/Investment (click on “The time-series data
of International Investment Position of China, Quarterly”).
11
Memorandum and Articles of Association of SAFE Investment Company Limited, CYBER
SEARCH CENTRE OF THE INTEGRATED COMPANIES REGISTRY INFORMATION SYSTEM, May
27, 1997, available at http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do for a nominal
fee.
12
Further elaborating, the Memorandum of the Articles of Association states that SIC is
established:
To act as an agent of the “People’s Bank of China Head Office/State
Administration of Foreign Exchange Head Office” in carrying out the
business of managing state foreign exchange reserve funds and all other
related monetary and financial business activities as instructed and
authorized by the “People’s Bank of China Head Office/State
Administration of Foreign Exchange Head Office.”

2013]

IMPROVING CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT REGULATION

433

For the first ten years of its existence, SIC was dealing with only a small
amount of money. How it came to be more active seems to be related to a rivalry
within the government between the Ministry of Finance and the PBoC. When the
creation of an SWF was first proposed, the PBoC rejected the idea. As it became
clear that an SWF indeed would come to be, the Bank argued that it would be in a
better position to manage the SWF than the Ministry of Finance. Instead, the
newly-created SWF--the China Investment Corporation (CIC)--was put under the
control of the State Council. Its staff, however, was largely tied to the Ministry of
Finance.13
The PBoC became further aggrieved by the method chosen to finance the
CIC. In 2003, Central Huijin Investment Ltd. was set up under the purview of the
PBoC to operate as the government’s investor in large state-owned financial
enterprises. In 2007, the Ministry of Finance issued special treasury bonds. The
bonds were used by the Ministry of Finance to purchase 100% of Central Huijin
from the PBoC at below-market prices14 as an initial capital contribution for the
CIC.15 Hence, control over investment into domestic state-owned banks was
wrenched from the PBoC in order to set up the CIC. In response to the deprivation
of one of its central functions as manager of investments into state-owned banks
and with the argument that it could have sufficiently operated an SWF, SAFE
started to use SIC more actively to manage excess portions of its reserves.16
3. Is SIC a Sovereign Wealth Fund?
SIC is not a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign
Wealth Funds, which is responsible for drafting the “Santiago Principles.” These
soft law guidelines are intended to stand as principles of general “best practices”
for SWFs. The full report created by the Working Group, which also includes the
background and intent behind the “Santiago Principles,” provides a definition of
SWFs. The Working Group identified three essential elements, which are that (1)
the general government owns the SWF, (2) the SWF invests in foreign financial
assets, and (3) the SWF is created by the government to fulfil specific financial

Memorandum and Articles of Association of SAFE Investment Company Limited (May 27,
1997), available at http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do for a nominal fee.
13
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS (Nov.,
2008) at 52.
14
Id.
15
About Us, CENT. HUIJIN INV. LTD., http://www.huijininv.cn/hjen/aboutus/aboutus_2008.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
16
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 12, at 52; see Jamil
Anderlini, China Investment Arm Emerges from Shadows, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2ee05a68-baf9-11dc-9fbc0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1WCJhPqxT.
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objectives.17 Additionally, the Working Group suggests examples of entities that
should not be categorized as SWFs:
This definition excludes, inter alia, foreign currency reserve
assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of
payments or monetary policy purposes, operations of stateowned enterprises in the traditional sense, government-employee
pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.18
Although it appears that funds held for balance of payments purposes, like SAFE’s
reserves, might be excluded, the Working Group explains in Appendix I to its
explanation of the “Santiago Principles” that the intention is to exclude foreign
exchange reserves managed solely for traditional purposes but that excess portions
managed like sovereign wealth may still be categorized as an SWF for definitional
purposes.19 Indeed, the Appendix states that “[w]hile SWFs may include reserve
assets, the intention is not to regard all reserve assets as SWFs.”20 Although no
primary information exists about SIC, from the information that has been gathered
in this article, it appears that the SIC falls within the Working Group’s definition.
As such, the article adopts the Working Group’s definition and categorizes SIC as
an SWF.
4. Investment
SAFE shares information concerning its international investment position
on its website. According to its July 2011 report, it is currently holding 329.1
billion USD in direct investments abroad and 260.4 billion USD in portfolio
investments, totalling 589.5 billion USD.21 Of those portfolio investments, 62.2
billion USD are in equities and 198.2 billion USD are in debt securities. 22
Nonetheless, the proportion of these investments that SIC manages on behalf of
SAFE remains unclear, as it appears that other asset management institutions are
also involved in handling SAFE’s reserves.
i.

Strategy

Although SIC does not state its own investment strategy, the SAFE
website has provided general information for the public in the form of “Frequently
Asked Questions” concerning the investment portfolio of its foreign exchange
17

INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS [IWG-SWF], SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES — “SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES” 27 (2008) [hereinafter Santiago Principles], available at www.iwgswf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
18
Id. at 3.
19
Id. at 27.
20
Id.
21
China’s International Investment Position (2011 Q2), supra note 10.
22
Id.
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reserves. The information is vague, but it does provide an idea of how SAFE is
investing. This article assumes that at least some of SAFE’s policy is applicable to
SIC’s investment strategy, although it remains unclear exactly to what extent and
in what manner.
As to the nature of its investments, SAFE affirms that it invests in
international commodities like gold, precious metals, and petroleum as a means to
diversify its portfolio, although it does so only to a limited extent.23 SAFE
additionally states that it invests primarily in “assets related to governments,
institutions, international organizations, and corporations in the developed and
major developing countries, and mutual funds and various other products such as
inflation-protected bonds and asset-backed securities” and acknowledges that with
so much capital, it has moved beyond only high-grade investments in order to
pursue various avenues of investment in which to puts its money.24
In response to a question about lack of transparency of the management
and operations of the foreign exchange reserves, SAFE responds that it has a
“cautious attitude in terms of information disclosure and ... [will] gradually
improve transparency in an active and steady manner.”25 As far as where SAFE
invests, it has stated that it tries not to invest in the PRC as such measures would
involve reconversion into renminbi, thereby negatively impacting the domestic
economy.26
In setting up its information sharing as a “Frequently Asked Questions”
portion of its website, SAFE is able to co-opt the dialogue by creating both
questions and answers suitable to it. For example, it asks itself, “Will China use
its foreign exchange reserves as a trump card or as an atomic weapon?”
Responding, it articulates how it sees itself as a “responsible long-term investor”

23

FAQs on Foreign Exchange Reserves (I), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, July
20, 2011, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on “FAQs on Foreign
Exchange Reserves (I)”) (explaining that SAFE limits its investments into these
commodities and energy resources because such investments could potentially raise prices
for consumers in China).
24
FAQs on Foreign Exchange Administrative Policies (3), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGE, July 7, 2010, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on
“FAQs on Foreign Exchange Administrative Policies (3)”).
25
FAQs on Foreign Exchange Reserves (III), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, July
28, 2010, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on “FAQs on Foreign
Exchange Reserves (III)”).
26
FAQs on Foreign Exchange Management Policies (1), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGE, July 2, 2010, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on
“FAQs on Foreign Exchange Management Policies (I)”) (explaining that reconversion into
renminbi would require the issuance of more domestic currency, which would further
exacerbate the problem of surplus renminbi).
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who “will not seek control” over investments that it makes.27 Another question
acknowledges that the international community sees China’s “stockpile of foreign
exchange reserves” as a sovereign wealth fund.28 SAFE responds by stating that
“China adheres to independent management of its foreign exchange reserves.”29
According to SAFE, it has been using independent asset management companies,
both domestic and foreign, to manage a portion of its foreign exchange reserves
since 1996.30 Hence, as stated above, the exact proportion of SAFE’s reserves that
SIC is managing remains unclear.
ii. Known Transactions
Nevertheless, certain investments that SIC has overseen have become
public. In 2007, Costa Rica established diplomatic relations with the PRC and cut
ties with Taiwan after 63 years of recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.31 In
exchange, the PRC agreed to purchase 300 million USD in Costa Rican bonds in
two equal instalments in January 2008 and January 2009. 32 The agreement
between the two countries explicitly links the purchase of the bonds to establishing
diplomatic ties with the PRC. In letters between SAFE’s deputy administrator and
Costa Rica’s finance minister, SAFE asks Costa Rica to perform “necessary
measures to prevent the disclosure of the financial terms of this operation and of
SAFE as a purchaser of these bonds to the public.”33 The transaction was only
revealed after Costa Rica’s largest newspaper, La Nación, won a court case in
which the judge ordered disclosure of the information.34 In order to effect the
transaction, SIC set up Bo An Investment Company in Hong Kong on April 19,
2007, which is still registered as an active company today.35 It is a wholly owned
subsidiary with SAFE officials acting as company directors. The company
operates as a recipient of interest payments on the bonds.36 Establishment of
27

FAQs on Foreign Exchange Administrative Policies (3), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGE, July 7, 2010, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on
“FAQs on Foreign Exchange Administrative Policies (3)”).
28
FAQs on Foreign Exchange Reserves (II), STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, July
25, 2011, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/News (click on “FAQs on Foreign
Exchange Reserves (II)”).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 12, at 52.
32
Id. at 53.
33
Jamil Anderlini, Beijing Uses Forex Reserves to Target Taiwan, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept.
12, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22fe798e-802c-11dd-99a9000077b07658.html#axzz1c3AYRA3Z.
34
Id.
35
Company Name Search: Bo An Investment Company Limited, CYBER SEARCH CENTRE
OF THE INTEGRATED COMPANIES REGISTRY INFORMATION SYSTEM,
http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cns_basic_comp.do (type Bo An Investment Company
Limited in search box to get date of registration).
36
Anderlini, supra note 33.

2013]

IMPROVING CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT REGULATION

437

another subsidiary like Bo An Investment Company demonstrates the possible
mechanisms that SAFE and SIC can use to further obscure their investments.
SIC has also been linked to purchases of small stakes in 63 of the London
Stock Exchange’s FTSE 100 companies. The investments are diversified, but the
focus seems to be on energy, basic materials, and communications companies.37
SIC also invested $2.5 billion USD into the American company TPG Capital,
which is one of the world’s largest private equity firms focused primarily on
leveraged buyouts.38 TPG is well known for the largest leveraged buyout in
history, which was conducted in 2007 to the tune of $43.2 billion for the
acquisition of Energy Future Holdings Corporation, a Texas power producer.39 In
January 2008, SIC attracted attention by buying stakes of less than one percent in
three different Australian banks. Together, the investments totalled about 528
million USD. The banks were three of the four largest banks in Australia and each
had been actively investing into the PRC.40 This article will use this investment as
an example of an SWF investing into equity securities in a developed economy.
Although the laws and regulations focused upon will only be those of Australia,
general ideas of oversight of SWFs like SIC may be extrapolated by considering
the obstacles that SIC needed to overcome when investing in the Australian banks.

37

Is It SAFE?, THE ECONOMIST BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 3:10PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/03/china%E2%80%99s_investments_fts
e_100. For a full listing of disclosed holdings by SIC of FTSE 100 companies, see List of
FTSE Company Holdings, THE ECONOMIST,
http://media.economist.com/media/finance/SAFE_FTSE100.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2012).
38
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 12, at 52. This transaction is
made even more interesting by the fact that a wholly-owned subsidiary of the China
Development Bank was reported in May 2011 to be joining the Government of Singapore
Investment Group and the Kuwait Investment Authority in investing hundreds of millions
of dollars into TPG. China Development Bank Seeks Minority TPG Stake, ALTASSETS,
May 23, 2011, http://www.altassets.net/private-equity-news/article/nz20812.html. TPG
Capital is said to manage about $48 billion USD and has invested about 8.1 billion USD
into Asia since 2008. Cathy Chan, TPG Said to Hire Goldman’s Steve Sun to Boost China
Deals, BLOOMBERG, May 24, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-24/tpgsaid-to-hire-goldman-sachs-steve-sun-to-boost-china-deals.html; China Joins Sovereign
Funds Buying TPG Stakes, THE AGE, May 23, 2011,
http://www.theage.com.au/business/world-business/china-joins-sovereign-funds-buyingtpg-stakes-20110523-1f089.html.
39
China Development Bank Said to Agree to Buy Stake in TPG, THE AGE, May 23, 2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-23/china-development-bank-said-to-agreeto-buy-stake-in-tpg.html.
40
Anderlini, supra note 33.
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B. Current Oversight
1. Hong Kong Legislation Governing SIC

Article 18 of the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the law of the PRC
does not apply in Hong Kong,41 with the exception of the twelve PRC laws,
regulations, and resolutions listed in Annex III to the Basic Law.42 The Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress in the PRC has the power to amend
this list, although it may only include laws “relating to defence and foreign affairs
as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region as
specified by this Law.”43 Currently, the laws in Annex III pertain primarily to
PRC symbolism, nationality, the sea, and diplomatic privileges and immunities.44
As such, Hong Kong law governs SIC.
i.

Restrictions on Capital Flows

Generally, Hong Kong has relaxed inward and outward foreign investment
law and foreign exchange controls. Under Article 112 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law,
Hong Kong is prohibited from adopting foreign exchange controls.45 There are
also no limitations on the amount of foreign currency that may be moved into or
out of Hong Kong or on the amount that may be kept in Hong Kong by residents
or nonresidents. Additionally, there are no limitations on capital repatriation or
remittance of profits and dividends. Hence, the process by which a foreign
investor may move money into and out of Hong Kong is relatively unhindered. As
such, SAFE experiences relatively few obstacles in moving money to its
subsidiary and then moving money out of Hong Kong into investments.
ii. Company Law
As a subsidiary of SAFE and as a private company incorporated in Hong
Kong, SIC is subject to Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance.46 Under Section 29
of the Companies Ordinance, a “private company” is defined as one that includes
in its articles of incorporation a maximum of up to 50 shareholders, a prohibition
on invitations to the public to purchase equity or debt, and a restriction on the
transfer of its shares.47 Under Section 121, accounts must be prepared, filed, and
audited. Nonetheless, it is unnecessary for the company to provide public

41

XIANGGANG JIBEN FA [Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People’s Republic of China], art. 18 (H.K.).
42
Id. at Annex III.
43
Id. at art. 18.
44
Id. at Annex III.
45
Id. at art 112.
46
Companies Ordinance, (1933) Cap. 32 (H.K.).
47
Id. at s 29.
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disclosure of such accounts.48 Under Section 107, annual returns must be filed.49
There are also no restrictions on direct investment into Hong Kong and no
limitations on foreign equity holdings in local firms.50 Hence, SAFE may wholly
own SIC without a problem and with little necessary information that must be
disclosed.
iii. Tax Law
In addition to complying with basic corporate law, SIC must also file tax
returns to the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department. Hong Kong is seen as a
low tax jurisdiction by companies in many other countries because of its nominal
tax rates and the absence of many taxes found in other jurisdictions, such as capital
gains taxes, value-added taxes, and withholding taxes. Particularly advantageous
for foreign investors is the fact that Hong Kong levies taxes based upon the
“territorial principle,” which provides that only Hong Kong-based profits are
subject to profits tax. Hence, if profit is derived outside of Hong Kong, a
company does not incur tax liabilities in Hong Kong.51 Many companies around
the world, including those in the PRC, consider Hong Kong a safe, stable, and
friendly environment for storing money. In fact, investors located in the PRC
constitute the highest percentage of investment into Hong Kong from abroad.52
This environment makes Hong Kong an attractive location from which to maintain
and manage currency globally.
The combination of a lack of restrictions on capital flow, very basic
applicable company law, and a near zero percent tax rate on profits makes Hong
Kong an ideal locale from which SAFE can maintain investments and grow excess
reserves in relative secrecy.
2. Australia’s Foreign Investment Regime as Applied in This Case
Study
i.

Foreign Investment Review

Australia employs a case-by-case review system in which any investment
that may potentially be contrary to the national interest can be subject to review by
authorities. In this system, the government has the ability to apply conditions to or
48

Id. at s 121.
Id. at s 107.
50
The exception is television broadcasting, in which foreign investors may only hold 10%
of shares and represent up to 49% of voting shares. GOV’T OF INDIA DEPT. OF ECON.
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LIBERALISATION OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT 34 (2004).
51
A Simple Guide on the Territorial Source Principle of Taxation, INLAND REVENUE
DEPARTMENT, Mar. 2011, http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/paf/bus_pft_tsp.htm (H.K.).
52
NARGIZA SALIDJANOVA, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, GOING OUT: AN
OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 9-10 (2011).
49
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block a proposal that it finds against national security interests.53 Australia’s
investment regime mandates that all foreign governments and their entities gain
approval from the Australian government prior to making specific types of
investments into Australia. The 1975 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act
enables the Treasurer or a delegate to determine whether particular investment
proposals might be contrary to national security interests. The Treasurer or
delegate makes such decisions in cooperation with the Foreign Investment Review
Board (FIRB) using Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy regulations for
guidance.
According to Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, foreign governments
or their entities are defined as “companies or other entities in which foreign
governments, their agencies or related entities have more than a 15 percent
interest.”54 They are also defined as “companies or entities that are otherwise
controlled by foreign governments, their agencies or related entities.”55 When
reviewing an investment, the government assesses the investor’s character. In its
Foreign Investment Policy, the government states that “proposals by foreign
owned or controlled investors that operate on a transparent and commercial basis
are less likely to raise national interest concerns than proposals from those that do
not.”56 The government additionally states that it looks particularly for whether
foreign government entities are operating on a fully commercial and arms-length
basis, and if not, how and to what extent the investors’ operations might affect the
national interest.57 Hence, foreign government entities’ ties to the government are
carefully scrutinized. Their operations will only be reviewed, however, if the
foreign investment review process is triggered.
The review process is triggered only if the investment has a certain
character or is considered a direct investment. As such, foreign government
entities must get approval when starting a business or acquiring interest in urban
land.58 They must also get approval prior to making direct investments into
Australia, regardless of the percentage stake of the investment. The Australian
government defines a direct investment as any investment that may lead to some
form of control over an enterprise. Namely, investments that involve contractual
agreements for, inter alia, loans or provision of services, or that result in
preferential, special or veto voting rights or the capacity to appoint directors, that
are in preparation for a takeover bid, or involve enforcement of a security interest
over a company’s shares or assets will need to be presented to the Australian
government for approval prior to the transaction.59 This mandate exists regardless
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of the size or nature of the target enterprise or the value of the transaction.60 If an
investment does not appear to involve the acquisition of any form of control, then
it need only be presented for review if it constitutes 10% or more of the target
entity.61
In addition, the Foreign Investment Policy highlights specific statutory
restrictions, which are placed upon investments in the banking sector, the
Australian airline industry, Australian airports, ships registered in Australia, and
Telstra, which is a telecommunications company that was originally state-owned
but is now mostly privatized.62 The Policy notes that additional consideration may
also be dedicated to investments in the media sector, transport industries, anything
military-related or that could potentially be used for a military purpose, encryption
and securities technology and systems, the operation of nuclear facilities, and the
extraction or rights to extract uranium or plutonium.63 If competition issues arise,
then the foreign investor will be subject to review by the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission pursuant to Australia’s competition laws.64
ii. Domestic Securities and Banking Regulations
In Australia, the foreign investment regime serves as the barrier erected
for foreign investors. Beyond it, however, are domestic regulations. When SIC
acquired stakes in Australia’s banks, it dealt with banking and securities
regulations. Under Australia’s securities regulations, if an entity winds up
acquiring an interest of 5% or more in any public company, then it must provide
notice and details of the transaction to the market operator and the company in
which it has gained the “substantial holding.”65 It should be noted that Australia’s
Corporations Act does not specifically address how substantial shareholding
notices should be handled when the “parent company” is a governmental organ.
This situation is troubling in that a government like China’s can have several
organs, each of which has subsidiary entities that are investing. As such, foreign
investment review seems to be the sole regulatory detection mechanism for
determining when a foreign government may be taking control of an investment.
When investing in the banking sector, investors are additionally subject to
Australia’s banking regulations and the Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act of
1997, which prevents “practical control” in a bank by any shareholder and limits
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shareholding in banks to 15% unless approval is obtained from the Treasurer.66
When SIC invested in three different Australian banks in 2008, it became subject
to this regime. Nonetheless, because the investments constituted less than one
percent holdings in each respective bank, neither foreign investment review nor
Australia’s securities or banking regulations were triggered.
In summary, SIC clearly falls within the scope of “foreign government
entity” under Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy as it is wholly-owned by
SAFE. Nonetheless, as long as SIC avoids taking stakes of 10% or more in any
target enterprise or 5% or more in any public company, does not gain some form
of control in any entity into which it invests, and stays away from sectors
considered important to Australia’s national security, it can invest widely and
relatively anonymously within Australia. Its investment into three of the four
largest Australian banks illustrates that it can exercise discreteness and conduct
transactions relatively undetected, even in a more regulated industry like banking
and even in a relatively stringent foreign investment regime like Australia’s.
C. Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in Hong Kong
1. International Award Enforcement Agreements
Any conflicts arising from SIC’s investments will invariably involve
private arbitration or the courts of the host country or Hong Kong. If an award is
rendered and the claimant wants to pursue SIC’s assets in Hong Kong, then the
Hong Kong court system will certainly be involved. Hong Kong adopted the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention) first by virtue of the United Kingdom acceding in 1977
along with Hong Kong, and then by the PRC extending its own membership to
Hong Kong in 1997.67 Mainland China and Hong Kong also have their own
arrangement guaranteeing mutual enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in each
territory.68 China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a Notice in December 2009
clarifying the legal grounds for and supporting enforcement in Mainland China of
ad hoc arbitral awards rendered by foreign institutions in Hong Kong.69 Hong
Kong’s domestic arbitration law is the Arbitration Ordinance, which went into
effect at the beginning of 2011 and replaced an older arbitration law that explicitly
differentiated between domestic and international arbitrations. Although the
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Ordinance has generally been well received by the arbitration community, it is
apparent that there is substantial leeway for courts to take a second look at
arbitration decisions at the enforcement stage in order to determine whether an
award may be enforced in Hong Kong. This discretion carries implications for
any party that wishes to enforce an award against SIC in Hong Kong.
2. Sovereign Immunity
In a recent case, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal held that an award
cannot be enforced against SIC in Hong Kong or anywhere else in the world; on
June 8, 2011, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal issued a decision aligning
Hong Kong’s sovereign immunity policy with that of the PRC in the case
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates.70 The case
raised the issue of whether Hong Kong should follow a restrictive or absolute
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Until this decision, Hong Kong had continued to
follow the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity, which it adopted from
British common law. The restrictive model does not allow the protection of
sovereign immunity to be extended to assets and activities that are commercial in
nature. The PRC, however, follows a doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity,
which provides protection to state-related entities, absent a waiver of sovereign
immunity, regardless of whether the entity was acting in a commercial or
sovereign capacity. In the case, the lower Court of Appeal held that Hong Kong
would continue to follow the restrictive model. The Court of Final Appeal,
however, embraced the PRC’s approach, thereby aligning Hong Kong with the
PRC on the issue of sovereign immunity.71
During the Court of Final Appeal’s review of the case, the Office of the
Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region sent an authorized letter to the court. The letter was
couched in unequivocal terms and influenced the Court as its majority opinion was
largely in accordance with the policies stated in the letter. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs clarified its own policy on sovereign immunity and its expectations of
Hong Kong as follows:
[T]he consistent position of China is that a state and its property
shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including
absolute immunity from jurisdiction and from execution. The
courts in China have no jurisdiction over any case in which a
foreign state is sued as a defendant or any claim involving the
property of any foreign state. China also does not accept any
70
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foreign courts having jurisdiction over cases in which the State
of China is sued as a defendant, or over cases involving the
property of the State of China. The regime of state immunity
concerns the foreign policy and overall interests of the state, and
the above-mentioned state immunity regime adopted by China
uniformly applies to the whole state, including the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.72

Therefore, this case has clarified the extent to which SIC and its assets are
protected from courts, not only in Hong Kong but around the world. The
implications at the award enforcement stage are that even if a party manages to get
SIC into a court or arbitral proceeding, it will not be able to enforce any rendered
award.

III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Why Should SIC’s Activities Be Regulated?
SIC has not signed onto the “Santiago Principles” and does not seem to be
trying to comply with them. Therefore, there are no known soft laws guiding it.
As it is a private limited liability company incorporated in Hong Kong, it is subject
to very few corporate and tax laws. Furthermore, although litigation or
commencement of arbitral proceedings against SIC might be possible with a
contractual waiver of sovereignty, enforcement of any award against it is virtually
impossible due to the PRC’s stance on sovereign immunity and SIC’s status as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of SAFE. As such, there seem to be very few laws or
regulations with which SIC must comply. Therefore, recipient countries are left to
govern the activities of SWFs like SIC.
In summary, we have a case study of an SWF that is intended to represent
an extreme example. It is a fund that appears to be dealing with a large sum of
money in a covert manner and has relatively few laws and regulations applicable
to it. Although lack of transparency does not necessarily mean that it is
imprudently investing or using funds for overtly political reasons, it does hold
important implications on the most basic level for the general public, both in
recipient countries and within the PRC. For PRC citizens, SIC is investing the
sovereign state’s excess foreign reserves. Losses on or mismanagement of
investments can negatively impact domestic and global economies. Without
disclosure of specific information about investments of the reserves, the Chinese
public cannot hold the fund accountable. For recipient countries’ citizens, lack of
information means that little is known about SIC’s intentions.
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B. How Should SIC’s Activities Be Regulated?
The advantage of the Santiago Principles is that they were created and are
being implemented by practitioners. As the “best practices” are coming from
internal sources in the industry, they are more vague but also more realistic and
perhaps can usefully serve as guidance for up-and-coming SWFs. Furthermore,
meetings of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which was
established by the International Working Group, enables SWFs to present a united
front and lobbying effort when communicating with the public and recipient
countries. Indeed, it was recently announced that advances have been made
toward establishing a permanent secretariat funded by the members of the Forum
so as to further facilitate this communication on a constant basis.73 These selfguiding mechanisms seem to be working well to provide reassurance to the many
stakeholders involved in SWFs’ investments. They do very little, however, when
an SWF does not identify as an SWF and does not participate in the Forum’s
exchanges. Hence, in the case of an SWF like SIC, we are left with international
investment treaties and recipient countries’ investment policies.
International investment treaties are particularly important for dispute
resolution involving SWFs operated by states with absolute sovereign immunity
stances. Such treaties may enable an arbitral panel to find that SWFs like SIC
have waived sovereign immunity at the arbitration stage. With jurisdictions like
Hong Kong, however, which do not have that many international investment
treaties, this aid will only occasionally be available. Furthermore, it remains to be
seen whether an SWF like SIC would be treated as the incorporated company that
it is so that it may fall within the treaties’ definition of “investor,” or whether an
arbitral panel may choose to take the unique nature of the SWF’s status as an
investing arm of the government into account, thereby finding that the SWF does
not fit into the meaning of “investor” intended by the participating states. As such,
at the end of the day, international investment treaties may provide only nominal
assistance in regulating SWFs like SIC.
Therefore, most of the work of oversight must be done by recipient
countries’ investment policies. The disadvantage to a model of oversight almost
solely reliant upon host states’ policies is that citizens in host countries with
corrupt authorities or which are generally lacking in laws or regulations governing
the types of complex investments that SIC might undertake are left vulnerable.
Victims may very well have little or no recourse for invested projects that go awry
or adversely affect them. In this type of scenario, both the host government and
SIC might be able to avoid accountability. Nonetheless, the advantage to a model
of oversight reliant upon recipient countries’ laws is that it allows each sovereign
73
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state to craft its own policies on entry of SWFs. In creating its own regulations,
the country can choose to balance how it plans to invite investments while still
garnering enough information or mandating enough disclosure to protect itself, its
citizens, and its businesses. Some countries that are particularly desperate for
investments might punch more holes into their armour to let capital through.
Other countries less in need of such investment might put up stronger walls.
Policies can also more easily be changed in times of economic crises.
Australia’s policies offer a glimpse of one country that has established a
carefully crafted foreign investment regime that welcomes foreign capital while
still reserving the right to review investments that may affect the market and the
country. In the case study provided, SIC was able to invest in Australia’s banks
without disclosure as long as the investments remained below certain trigger
points. The banks welcomed the investments and SIC was satisfied that it was
able to conduct the transactions without disclosing much public information.
As a part of its Freedom of Investment process, the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has made inroads into gathering
together and examining recipient countries’ foreign investment review policies and
disclosure requirements.74 It has also been instrumental in advancing general “best
practices” policies for fair, balanced treatment of SWFs. 75 The collected
information and “best practices” principles provide useful guidance to countries
crafting their own investment policies. Nonetheless, the nature of the OECD as an
organization of 34 developed countries has led it to focus primarily upon the
concerns of those countries. As such, the set of economic issues and
considerations addressed are limited by the nature of the data set. Many of the
countries that are potentially most adversely affected by covert SWF activity have
been left out of the dialogue and little guidance is available.
Since 2006, 76 the OECD has been setting up roundtables as one
component of its Freedom of Investment process, which involves all 34 OECD
member countries, the eight non-member signatories to the Declaration on
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International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 77 other major nonmembers like China, India, and Russia, and occasionally some sovereign wealth
funds (China, Qatar, and Russia).78 At the roundtables, countries peer review
investment regulations and the issues arising from them. At the 10th Roundtable in
2009, participating countries committed to engaging non-member countries more
deeply in discussions.79

IV. CONCLUSION
Regulating SWFs like SIC involves communication between countries
about how to craft thoughtful foreign investment review policies in order to avoid
global financial repercussions.
As this article has demonstrated, current
international norms and agreements do little to facilitate oversight of SIC. As such,
recipient countries are left with the task of trying to regulate financial behemoths
like SIC. Although states differ greatly in the nature of their economies and
resultantly have different foreign investment policies, dialogue between countries
concerning “best practices” geared toward the unique nature of SWFs will enable
countries to reflect on the balance they should strike between welcoming SWFs’
investments and protecting stakeholders. Hence, advances made by the OECD are
a start. Nonetheless, communication between “like economies” on a regular basis
as well as enhanced communication beyond the limited set of countries currently
participating in the OECD’s efforts would be beneficial for addressing issues
arising from SWFs’ investments.
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